Impacts of Top Five Executives’ Compensation on Employee Wages

Qianqian Li, Unyong Pyo

Abstract


This paper studies the impacts of incentive compensation to top five executives on employee wages. We employ pay-performance sensitivity to measure executive incentive compensation. Using the sample during 1992 – 2017, we find that executive compensation has negative impacts on employee wages. In addition, we examine the impacts of executive incentive compensation on employee wages in different industries and find that the impacts are more severe in technology firms than in non-technology firms. Finally, we show that the executives with higher incentive compensation are more likely to suppress employee wages in financially safe firms. Our results suggest that while top management teams are compensated as a team on average, they are compensated as isolated individuals on other aspects. Furthermore, firm performance may not always improve in the long run by granting high incentive compensation to top executives.

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v12n1p242

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.


International Journal of Financial Research
ISSN 1923-4023(Print)ISSN 1923-4031(Online)

 

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